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A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS. By Ronald P. Sokol. Charlottes-

ville, Virginia: The Michie Company. 1965. Pp. 289. $10,00.
That the writ of habeas corpus has an honorable history in defense of
liberty is not to be doubted. That its current popularity, after the United
States Supreme Court decisions in Fay v. Noia' and Townsend v. Sain,2
creates problems in the administration of criminal justice, has been extensively
documented. 3 What is amazing is that since 1886 nobody has written a book on
how to obtain federal habeas corpus. 4 Until, that is, Mr. Sokol set his capable
mind and agile pen to the task of producing A Handbook of Federal Habeas
Corpus.
Habeas corpus in Anglo-American law traces at least to Edward I, when
several varieties of the writ were used to compel defendants and jurymen to
appear at trial.5 It is, however, of habeas corpus ad subjiciendun-the Great
Writ-that Sokol writes and which principally concerns courts today.6 A close
relative of this form of the writ was used in the struggle between the common
law courts and Chancery, to release those whom Chancery had committed for
contempt. It developed originally to test the jurisdiction of inferior tribunals;
courts at Westminster were fond of using habeas corpus to find the power of an
inferior court wanting. 7 The writ came, however, to have broader use than
against judicially-ordered confinement. In the political turmoil of the seventeenth century, it served to free those whom the King had committed for
"reasons of State." Of this use, Selden said that habeas was "the highest
remedy in law for any man that is imprisoned." 8 And so, with the expansion
and strengthening provided by the Petition of Right,9 the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1679,10 and later English statutes, 11 the writ came to be available to test
any confinement, by government official or private person, of anyone who could
1372

U.S. 391 (1963).

2372 U.S. 293 (1963).
3 See, e.g., Symposium, Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction
Review of Sentences in the United States Courts, 33 F.R.D. 363 (1963) (with many articles
and some suggested statutory changes); Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 945 (1964); United States ex rel. Walker v. LaVallee, 224 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.N.Y.
1963) (district judge remarks on problems in his district).
4 This fact is noted by SoxoL, Preface to FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS at v (1965)
[hereinafter the book is cited as SoxoL]. The 1886 work was HuRD, THE WRIT oF HABEAS
CoRPUs.
5
PLucKxNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoammoN LAW 57 (4th ed. 1948). Plucknett
draws heavily on the more extended treatment of habeas corpus in 9 HoLDswoRrH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 108-25 (1926).
Forerunners of the writ date at least to Roman law. See Comment, 53 -CALI. L. REv.
224, 227 n.14 (1965), and material there cited.
69 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 5 at 108-12; see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399
n.5 (1963) ; Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961) (habeas corpus ad prosequendum).
7PLUC3NETT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 57.
8 Quoted ibid.; see 9 HOLtSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 114.
90 See 6 id. at 34-37 (1927),; 9 id. at 115 (1926) ; PLVCxNETT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 53.
1 An Act for better securing the liberty of the subject, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679).
11 E.g., An Act for more effectually securing the liberty of the subject, 56 Geo. 3, c.
100 (1816); see 6 HorDswORa', op. cit. supra note 5, at 118-19.
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hie himself or his next friend to court to file a petition.' 2 In this form,
habeas
3
corpus is guaranteed in the body of the United States Constitution.1
Today, federal habeas is available to those illegally in federal custody,14
illegally in custody for an act done under federal authority, 15 in custody for
commission of an act permitted by the law of nations,16 and in custody in
violation of the federal constitution or federal statute. 17 Also, the related
"motion to vacate sentence" is available for those convicted of federal crimes. 18
By far the most important of federal habeas provisions concerns the state
prisoner held "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States."1 9 When, in March 1963, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Great Writ as indispensable to the guarantee of liberty from unconstitutional state action, it gave substance to its pronouncements by striking down
two hurdles which had stood in the way of state prisoners obtaining habeas
review of federal claims. In Fay v. Noia,20 speaking of the exhaustion of state
remedies requirement of 28 United States Code, section 2254,21 the court
adverted to "the manifest federal policy that federal constitutional rights of
personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review,"'22 and went on to discard a century's worth of courtmade constrictions of federal habeas. In Townsend v. Sain,23 the Court reaffirmed the power and duty of a federal district judge to hold a full evidentiary hearing
upon the petition in enumerated cases in which "the facts are
'24
in dispute.
It was perhaps a foreboding of Fay and Townsend that led a law professor to argue in January 1963 for restriction of federal habeas for state
prisoners; 25 it was experience with the doctrine of those cases that led a federal
district judge with thousands of state prisoners in his district devoutly and
publicly to wish that states would begin of their own accord to review convictions obtained by allegedly illegal means. 26
In all of the pother, with district courts freely exercising their power to
12pLT CXNETT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 57-58; SoxroL § 1-5.1; United States ex rel.
Bryant v. Houston, 273 Fed. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921).
13 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it."
See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807).
14 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c),(1) (1964).

15 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2) (1964).
10 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (4) (1964).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964).
18 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964)-

19 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964).
20 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
2128 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964).
22 372 U.S. at 424.

23 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
24 Id. at 312-13; see Sokol § 13, at 67.
25 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
H Rv. L. Rlv. 441 (1963). The publication of this article preceded the decisions in Fay and
Townsend by just two months.
26United States ex rel. Walker v. LaVallee, 224 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.N.Y. 1963). And
see material cited at note 3 supra.
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assign inexperienced counsel to represent indigent petitioners before judges who
themselves have acquired little technical knowledge of federal habeas, Mr.
Sokol has come to the rescue with his excellent manual. It is, he says, "designed
for lawyers and judges who are handling or deciding habeas corpus cases.
If some errant law student, or anyone else for that matter, desires greatly to
look at it, he has only my reluctant permission."27
Sokol sets out to define each relevant statutory term, to discuss who may
apply for the writ, who is a proper respondent, which court has jurisdiction,
and similar initial considerations. The organization of his book follows the
case through the order to show cause, hearing on the petition, and judicial review. Sokol discusses limitations on the availability of the writ, including an
excellent section on exhaustion of state remedies, the inapplicability of ordinary
res judicata principles to habeas, and the provisions for dismissal of frivolous
petitions. His final section deals with problems peculiar to petitions of indigent
prisoners with a summary of statutory and case-law authorizations and mandates for easing their trip through the courts. Finally, Sokol sets out all
relevant federal statutes and rules, and an excellent set of forms drawn from
the practicing bar and from district court files. 28 His emphasis is, therefore,
practical and workmanlike. The book is nonetheless couched in readable style,
with great attention to the ethical and tactical decisions which face an attorney,
particularly one assigned to represent an indigent petitioner, in federal habeas
litigation.
One should especially note Sokol's attention to the requirement of a hearing.
He sets forth and analyzes in detail the Townsend v. Sain2 9 criteria for holding
a full evidentiary hearing.8 0 He suggests to the attorneys for petitioner and
respondent, and to the district judge, ways in which court time can be saved
and justice subserved with intelligent use of documentary evidence in the
form of affidavits and trial transcripts.$' Since habeas corpus is an original
civil proceeding, Sokol wonders aloud to what extent the provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on depositions and discovery may apply;
there is no informative case law, and he ably outlines the competing conten32
tions and arguments.
27

SoxoL, Prefaceat vii.
28 SoxoL, app. C, at 189-220. Id. at 192-99, Sokol sets out a form used in the Northern
District of Illinois and elsewhere for prisoners' habeas petitions; the form asks all questions
pertinent to a determination of the merits of the petition. By the use of such forms, district
courts do material service to indigent prisoners. It may be suggested that if courts will not
adopt such forms of their own accord, attorneys can press them to do so by appealing
denials of habeas based upon alleged formal deficiencies. Once the court of appeals of a
given circuit has accepted a form petition as adequate to present facts stating a cause of
action for habeas corpus, district courts all over the circuit can perhaps be brought to see
the light.
We do have a minor quibble about the organization of the book. The discussion of
motions to vacate sentence should have been placed toward the beginning, along with the
general treatment of habeas, not left to the section on "Limitations on the Availability of
the Writ." The book has a good index, table of contents, and cross-reference system, so
this is not much of a problem.
29 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
30 SoxoL § 13, at 67.
31 SoxoL §§ 13, 14.2, 14.3, 32.

32 SoxoL § 18.
HeinOnline -- 53 Cal L. Rev. 916 1965

19651

BOOK REVIEWS

One thing which the book lacks, however, is a discussion of the social policy
which ought to govern federal habeas for state (and federal) prisoners when
the Supreme Court reinterprets old rights and cognizes new ones. The retroactivity of Gideon v. Wainwright83 had been put squarely in issue before the
s
book was published, by Justice Harlan's dissent in Picklesimer v. Wainwright. 4
s5
Now with the post-publication decision of the Court in Linkletter v. Walker,
that 'the Mapp v. Ohio8 6 exclusionary rule may not be invoked to secure federal
habeas by a state prisoner whose conviction became final before Mapp, the
question of retroactivity becomes central to great numbers of habeas cases.
The Court grounded its decision in Linkletter on broad criteria of state
"reliance" upon the previous rule as enunciated in Wolf v. Colorado,3 7 the
rationale of the decision in Mapp that state courts must exclude illegally
seized evidence, and the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice.
It decided that states had relied on the Wolf doctrine; that the prime purpose
of the exclusionary rule was to deter future police conduct, not bar from admission probative, albeit illegally-seized, matter as evidence of guilt; and,
that great numbers of federal habeas petitions would be engendered if Mapp
were retroactive. These considerations led the Court to hold that Mapp should
be given prospective operation only.
Perhaps Sokol can be excused for not venturing extensively into this territory, though he had adequate warning that the questions were ripe; his admirable procedural handbook could become overblown beyond its pretensions
and perhaps beyond its usefulness. But he should not be excused for failing to
mention the matter at all. The core provision of the federal habeas statute
relating to retroactivity is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States." 38 The court in Linkletter made no attempt to
interpret this statutory language. The words "in violation of" require, we believe, a determination of the relation between the infringement of the prisoner's
rights and his confinement. In making this determination, we suggest that
concepts of causation not unrelated to those used in the law of torts may be
relevant to a decision. 9 The easiest illustration would come of asking the
question, "but for the violation, would the prisoner be in custody?" If the answer is no, then arguably habeas should be granted; such an analysis would
have led to an opposite result to that reached in Linkletter. A more sophisticated
analysis would ask, "what concepts of personal liberty sought to be guaranteed
by the constitutional provision violated are offended by the continued incarceration of the petitioner?" The answer to this question would turn on concepts of competitive fairness looking to the adjustment of state and private
interests. How much of a price ought the state to pay in disruption of its
system of criminal justice for the unlawful actions of its servants with respect
to the petitioner? How much does the argument "he would have been found
guilty anyway" violate our notions that "guilt" is not only a finding of coercive,
83 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
34 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
35 85 Sup. Ct. 1731 (1965).
86 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37 338 U.S. 25 (1949).

38 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964).
89 See generally Cole, Windfall and Probability: A Study of "Cause" in Negligence
Law (pts. 1, 2), 52 CA im. L. REv. 459, 764 (1964).
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objective fact, but also a conclusion to be reached only after certain required
procedures designed to safeguard and affirm respect for the dignity and personal freedom of actual and potential prisoners? In short, the federal statutory
scheme seems to require a detailed examination of the foundation in law for
the imprisonment of a particular person, as well as evaluation of collective
and impersonal considerations such as "reliance," "federalism," and "administration of justice." It is to be regretted that Sokol did not pursue this question
at all, if only to cite and evaluate some of the ponderous body of literature in
the field. 40
A further problem arises in connection with Sokol's discussion of mootness.
He cites a 1957 Second Circuit case, United States ex rel. Smith v. Martin,41
for the proposition that habeas "is not available merely because the petitioner
can show that he might, if resentenced get a shorter sentence." 42 Martin contains strong dicta which affirm the opposite proposition, and these dicta were
transmuted into holding in the 1964 Second Circuit case of United States ex rel.
Durocher v. LaVallee.43 In the latter case, a New York state prisoner sought
federal habeas because he was denied counsel in criminal proceedings later
used by New York to give him "second offender" status. This status carried
the possibility of a higher sentence for the New York crime for which he was
incarcerated at the time of filing his petition. The court of appeals, reversing
the district court, held that federal habeas was available, though the petitioner's
New York sentence was less than the permissible maximum for first offenders.
The "possibility" of a shorter sentence, held the court, "is sufficient to warrant
44
the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus.1
In fact, Sokol's entire discussion of the use of habeas for purposes other
than outright release from physical custody could have used closer attention.
It has been held, for example, that habeas is a proper remedy for a prisoner
who is deprived of certain privileges, or subject to unconstitutional discrimination in the prison; 45 this is so even though granting the relief requested will
leave the prisoner still lawfully in jail. That is, habeas may be used in some
cases to test the nature and quality of a confinement, as well as the fact of
46
confinement.
40

B.g., Picklesimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 3 (1963) (dissenting opinion); United
States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998
(1964). See generally material cited in Linkletter v. Walker, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965).
41242 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1957).

42 SOKOL § 6, at 32.
43330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964).

44330 F.2d at 305 n.2. Compare Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957), with
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
45 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
46 This is, however, a disputed use of the writ, Annot., 155 A.L.R. 145 (1944) ; Sarshik
v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944). CI. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941), in which
the Court invalidated a state prison regulation restricting the right of prisoners to file
habeas petitions. The Court's opinion is unclear as to the federal jurisdictional basis for
nullifying the regulation. In some states, it is clearly established that habeas lies to remove
unlawful conditions in an otherwise lawful confinement. See, e.g., cases cited in Annot.,
152 A.L.R. 143 (1944); In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1961). The better federal remedy for unlawful conditions of confinement is probably a
civil suit for injunctive relief, alleging denial of civil rights under color of state law. See
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Sokol rightly points out that the Supreme Court decided in McNally v.
Hill47 that habeas will not lie to attack an invalid judgment and commitment
where the petitioner is also held in custody under a lawful judgment and commitment. He fails, however, to note an exception to that rule clearly enunciated
by the Court in Ex parte Hull:4 8 Where probation or parole has been revoked
because of a subsequent conviction, the prisoner may be discharged on a writ
of habeas corpus challenging the second conviction without attacking the
first conviction. This is so because the invalid second conviction was the predicate of the revocation of parole, and the granting of relief may effect the
petitioner's complete discharge from custody.
Questions of custody and mootness are much litigated today, and it is to be
regretted that Sokol did not spend more time analyzing the growing body of
legal literature on the subject. 49
All considered, however, Sokol has done a necessary and admirable job.
Too much emphasis is perhaps given in the press and legal journals to the
impact upon federal habeas law of new Supreme Court decisions dealing with
criminal procedure. Certainly Sokol's book will be important to prisoners whose
convictions were obtained, the Court now finds, unconstitutionally. But among
the work's more important uses, one has reason to hope, will be in helping
lawyers of conscience obtain freedom for those whose race, nationality, or
financial condition precluded a fair trial on their initial conviction, and a
meaningful review on direct appeal. The struggle for Negro freedom-for jobs,
equal schooling, and equal accommodation-and the highblown rhetoric of
the War on Poverty have perhaps obscured the fact that thousands languish in
jail on "bum raps." Granted, habeas does not lie to determine the truth or
falsity of an adjudication of guilt. Nevertheless, now that federal habeas has
been stripped of the requirement that a prisoner exhaust himself and his futile
state remedies, it will ensure inquiry into the procedural iniquities characteristic
of trials of the poor and discriminated. Sokol serves this cause not only by
outlining the law of habeas, but by suggesting ways for courts, petitioners'
counsel, and attorneys-general to facilitate the receipt, hearing, and fair disposition of habeas petitions.
In sum, with wit, style, accuracy, and thoroughness, Sokol has done bench
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). But see United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164 n.25
(1963), citing with approval cases allowing tests of conditions on confinement by both
habeas and denial of civil rights suits.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter has aptly remarked, "I think it is fair to say that the scope

of habeas corpus in the federal courts is an untidy area of our law that calls for much
more systematic consideration than it has thus far received." Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 184 (1947) (dissenting opinion). He went on to list eight categories in which the
Court did not draw sharp jurisdictional lines in granting federal habeas. Id. at 185-87. And
see In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894), in which Mr. Justice Field held federal habeas
available to test the quality of a federal prisoner's confinement. Bonner was cited with
approval in Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). See notes 47-48 inlra and accompanying text.
47 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
48 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
49
E.g., Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (1965), reversing 230 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Calif.
1964); United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 998 (1964).
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and bar a great service. We hope that he will not mind a law student, and a law
professor, to whom he gives only "reluctant permission" to study his book,5"
saying so.
Ira Michael Heyman*
Michael E. Tigart
50

SoxoL, Preface at vii.

* B.A. 1951, Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1956, Yale Law School. Professor of Law,

University of California, Berkeley.
t B.A. 1962, University of California, Berkeley. Editor-in-Chief,
Review.
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